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Integrating Open Source Protections into SCADA Networks 
Abstract 
Craig Valli 
School of Computer and Information Science 
Edith Cowan University 
Email: c.valli@ecu.edu.au 
SCADA (Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition) networks control much of the industrialised 
nations production and supply complexes. Various government reports and investigations have 
highlighted the vulnerabilit)! of these systems. Many of these systems are on private networks which are 
increasingly being connected to systems that are accessible from other networks such as the Internet. 
Thereare a range of open source tools that now offer fonctionality that can be used to secure SCADA 
networks from intrusion or compromise. This paper explores some of the issues with current SCADA 
deployment trends from a network security perspective and then examines open source 
countenneasures that could be used to help mitigate some of these risks. 
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INTRODUCTION 
SCADA Systems are increasingly mentioned as weak points in critical infrastructure in various 
Government reports. The reports from various agencies see SCADA systems as highly vulnerable to 
attack or compromise that would result in catastrophic failure of national critical infrastructure. Many 
of these systems are used to run modern industrial complexes that supply modern Western nations with 
many of the services and goods that they take for granted. These systems are to be fouud in but not 
limited to petroleum complexes, power generation grids, water supply networks, sewerage networks 
and most other complex systems that require constant computer-based monitoring or controL 
Compromise or even disruption to these systems could have catastrophic consequences resulting in 
massive economic impact or loss of life. 
Many of the older proprietary systems are now being upgraded to open platform systems that utilise 
open protocols such as Distributed Network Protocol 3 (DNP3). Many of the newer SCADA systems 
also use modern open standard communications networks to provide access to the SCADA systems 
that then talk to the underlying control systems. These networks even if totally private will almost 
atypically run the TCP/IP range of protocols and supporting services. Consequently, some of this 
traffic may actually travel on or rely upon open networks such as the Internet to provide !bese conduits. 
Of greater risk is that some of these systems utilise wireless systems for system control condnits. 
This paper will examine the threats to SCADA systems as result of the decreasing use of proprietary 
protocols and related equipment' and their move to open protocol based systems. The paper will also 
outline available open source countermeasures to some of these threats. The paper will not deal with 
the Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC) found withing SCADA systems but the egress of packets to 
and from these devices. 
OPEN IS,NOT ALWAYS SECURE 
SCADA is one set of systems where it could be argued the use of open source or protocols significantly 
impacts the security of the systems. SCADA systems are moving to the DNP3 protocol away from 
other control protocols, these are delivered wrapped in a TCP/IP transport or actual raw DNP3 packets 
across the chosen media. The logic behind having a "common" protocol across these systems is so that 
each platform or vendor device can interact at a network or system level. This logic seems complete 
enough and one that makes economic sense i.e. economies of scale, one protocol, one lot of training 
etc. From a security perspective this is not true as a mono-culture tends not to be resilient as others i.e 
break one, break all. 
So one has to ask what is the security benefit in moving away from proprietary protocols . running on 
closed systems to open protocols running across open networks? Common protocols have been proven 
to be problematic already in network defence particularly if the flaw is inherent. If we take WiFi or 
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802.11 equipment as a recent example, if it meets the standard for 802.l1b it is regardless of 
manufactnrer susceptible to a wide range of protocol based attacks (Baird & Lynn, 2003; Bellardo & 
Savage, 2003). These protocol based attacks are ef(ective and essentially. unstoppable without further 
countenneasures or extension of the 802.llb protocol. What could occur ifDNP3 or ModBUS or a 
siruilar SCADA specific protocol was found to have the same level of exploit? . 
Even closed or supposedly private networks that use wireless infrastrncture are increasingly exposed as 
open to attack (Valli & Wolski, 2004). Take the fact that many modem SCADA systems have http 
enabled management consoles that are accessed via a web browser and use either direct wired or 
wireless connectivity to achieve connection and you will have significant security problems already 
associated with this mode of network transport. Wireless based networks use a wide range of protocols 
and rates of transmission and some even use half duplex transmission to overcome low speed issues, 
but nonetheless the irrefutable fact is that they are transmitting across a commonly acc6ssible media i.e. 
the atmosphere. This enables the tr.ansmissions to be susceptible to denial of service at a physical layer 
with wireless jamming devices (fi:oad and Jones, 2004). These physical attacks are in addition to 
known exploits against particular wireless protocols which are numerous (Baird & Lynn, 2003; 
Bellardo & Savage, 2003; Osborne, 2003;). Even if the wireless communications use encryption or 
VPN to protect the transmission there are numerous tools that can break, intercept or even inject into 
these types of network countermeasures (Airjack, 2004). 
Even though SCADA has been flagged as a problem for at least 5 years most commercial Ethernet 
centric frrewalls and network security countenneasures are focussed on the resolution of problems with 
TCPiIP protocols and still largely ignore SCADA relevant protocols (NlSCC, 2005). This hinders the 
development of enterprise initiatives as alternative products or 3'd party plugins must be adopted often 
with varying levels of integration success into a network infrastrnctnre.· 
OPEN SOURCE COUNTERMEASURES 
The typical countenneasures that are utilised for securing EthemetlTCP/IP based networks apply to 
SCADA networks in theoretically the same way. These tools would include typically include a 
firewall, intrnsion detection systems and some method of protocol analysis. This section of the paper 
examines briefly open source offerings that are currently available for SCADA systems that provide 
these featnres. 
Firewalls 
Firewalls are a primary defensive mechanism for any network situation and through stateless or stateful 
inspection will allow or disallow egress of network packets through a gateway device or control point. 
Support for SCADA protocols in commercial software is scant at best (NlSCC, 2005, p.3!). However, 
the open source community has developed a firewall for the ModBUS protocol that runs on Linux 
using extensions to the kernel netfilter firewalling (REF modbusfw).· The filtering occurs on four 
header values these are; . 
I. Function code ~ filtering is based on single or multiple function codes 
2. UnitID ~ filter on specified ID 
3. Reference Number - filtering on a specified reference number 
4. Length- Filter on size greater than, less than or equal too. 
This level of filtering allows for a reasonable degree of protection and ability to make rulesets that for 
instance would be able to trap buffer overflow attempts, incorrect or malformed commands, out of 
range packets or probative packets. 
As this type of frrewalling is a kernel level activity the amount of logging that can be afforded these 
particular filtering functions is extensive. This allows for a rich pictnre of network activity and any 
associated problems to be developed using appropriate analysis tools. 
Intrnsion Detection Systems 
There are commercial offerings that have limited support for intrusion detection on SCADA based 
protocols but this is steadily increasing and should be a major part of any defensive strategy. 
The open source Snort IDS has the ability to allow for the creation of custom rulesets and one of the 
supported sets available for SCADA comes from DigitalBond. The rulesets cover both DNP3 and 
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ModBUS and cover buffer overflows, unauthorised commands and variety of other functions that need 
monitoring Or trapping. The rulesets also have a network capture file that can be played back to verify 
the functioning of the rulesets before deployment of SCADA aware IDS. These rulesets although 
rudimentary in nature provide a sound basis for building an IDS capability that deals with DNP3 and 
ModBUS protocol traffic in an enterprise networksitnation. Combined with other Snort utilities and 
extensions such as Snort Wireless, SnortReport, ACID or Base this type of system could provide sight 
into the SCADA networks of an enterprise providing valuable feedback to network 'and security 
administrators. 
One of the principal conduits for SCADA systems are wireless systems. The use of the Snort Wireless 
extensions from http://www.snort-wireless.org provide some protections or at least warning that 
systems are being attacked. AsValli(2004) points out, the effectiveness of these systems in preventing 
attacks are limited but some protections or at least alerts are better than none. In the often quoted 
Maroochy Water Services case the use of a wireless intrusion detection system could have resulted in 
early detection of the attacks. 
Honeypot systems 
It is well documented in the literature that honeypot systems have proven their worth in being able to 
trap, contain or waste resources of persons or malcode with malicious intentions. Their purpose varies 
based on the intent of the deploying entity however, the common tenet is the emulation of a 
service/function within a network to effectively deceive the attacking entity tbat they are in fact 
attacking or probing a real system. 
There is an extension for the open source honeyd honeypot to provide emulation of PLC and SCADA 
technologies. The project files are a series of enhancement and additions to the existing honeyd 
architecture that enable mimicry of ModBUS and a PLC. The level of emulation is medium with OS 
fingerprints provided for a range of commonly available PLC devices plus supporting scripts to 
emulate the ModBUS protocol. 
This, like the Snort IDS rulesets, provides the basis for development of a sound, customised enterprise 
defensive approach. The scripts are customisable and allow an organisation to provide a customised 
and purpose designed system. The outputs from this type of system could be used to effectively detect 
inside malfeasance and also attempted penetration of systems from outside. It should be noted that the 
developers of the honeypot noted that the system would be best deployed near a real system but were 
not aware of active and ou-going attacks on SCADA systems (Pothamsetty & Franz, 2004) 
Protocol Analysis 
One of the key diagnostic tools for any network administrator is the use of a protocol analysis tool that 
allows analysis of network traffic at the packet level. The open source tool Ethereal does filtering and 
decodes on DNP3, ModBUS TCP (Ethereal, 2005). This allows for network monitoring to occur even 
if the current frrewalls and other countermeasures are currently insufficient in coverage and scope. The 
use of filters in Ethereal allows for the monitoring of the enterprise network. For example monitoring 
could occur for the hex string 02040506090AOFJ2 which is an unauthorised write request to a PLC 
which could then generate an aleri or log entry for subsequent actioning. 
CONCLUSION 
There are problems with commercial systems not fulfilling or even supplying network countermeasures 
that are at least aware of SCADA protocols. Open source solutions offer some partial remedy to the 
enterprise deployment of countermeasures and monitoring for SCADA systems. 
The use of Ethereal as a defensive mechanism within enterprise networks would currently allow for a 
highly granular approach to implementation of surveillance into SCADA based networks. This network 
intelligence in tnrn could be used to develop or extend Snort rulesets or the honeypot to provide a 
robust and tailored solution for the particular enterprise. 
The lack of a suitable firewalling is an issue that needs urgent research and development in SCADA 
networks. Firewalls are the primary and often only ,defence in a networked environment. They are 
primary filters of malcode and unauthorised transmission across a network interface. The ModBUS 
fIrewall implementation provides some basic protections for these types of network however, DNP3 
and other networks are afforded minimal protections, 
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A network protocols become more open an~ widely know !be potential for exploits will also 
;v, Sc,<\V urgent research is needed now to combat cyber attacks that for !be fITst time could have 
iltcrease. d ennanent consequences. . 
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